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It is now common knowledge that China's data is bad, and China's environment is
polluted. In this paper I develop a simple pollution intensity index to test China's existing
national and local environmental data, to answer the questions: "Bad" how? "Polluted"
why? And finally: what can be done?
I find that China's existing data is rudimentary, piecemeal, and inaccurate. I find that
government data is not detailed, not transparent, and that non-governmental attempts at
improving data quality and transparency are hamstringed by lack of official support. These
data quality and transparency issues contribute to the intractability of China's industrial
pollution. I also find that a pollution intensity index, like the one I develop and test in this
study, can help policymakers identify pollution hotspots years before the hotspots worsen
into public health emergencies. By running 2010 data through a simple algorithm, I isolate
a pollution hotspot that took the Chinese government until 2013 to discover without this
framework. I show that better and more accurate data, along with a mandate for
continuous monitoring and analysis, can shift the current strategy from pollution control to
pollution prevention, ultimately saving time, money, and lives.
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In this thesis I propose a more functional framework for information transparency
and data management in China than what currently exists, by conducting a simple
experiment to determine what can and cannot be studied with existing pollution data for
China's 113 Key State Environmental Protection Cities. I make the case that better data will
allow for better policy control of China's pollution situation; I show that preventing
pollution is not just desirable, it is possible today.
Chapter 1 provides context for the experiment, including a literature review of
recent media reports on China's escalating pollution crisis. Chapter 1 also presents the
rationale and goals for this study. Chapter 2 describes the experiment's methodology,
results, and includes an analysis. Chapter 3 presents four key findings, or lessons,
extrapolated from the experiment that can be applied to improve China's existing
information framework. The conclusion closes with final observations and
recommendations.
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Until now, environmental management in China was largely a top-top discussion,
and environmental protection was a developmental luxury to be pursued inasmuch as it
benefits economic goals. This pattern can no longer be sustained. The growth-paramount
development strategy has plunged China into a minefield of localized pollution problems
that threaten the country's public health, social stability, and the very economic growth
that it sought to perpetuate. The only way forward is to open up - include more criteria in
the definition of success, include more indicators in the monitoring of progress, include
more voices in decision-making processes, and hold more stakeholders responsible for
protecting their local environments.
Environmental Advocacy
Advocacy in the form of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have officially
existed in China since 1994 (C. Wu 2002). However, Unfavorable tax laws and a lack of
philanthropic culture (Mo 2010) combine to create an atmosphere where small local NGOs
are perpetually under-funded. Therefore, while civil society in the United States is
supported by local grassroots activism, China's civil society is dominated by the super-
privileged. It is only the high-profile international- or Beijing- based organizations with
elite connections that have the resources to influence national policy. Furthermore, even
the influence of the biggest environmental players is weak because the political validity of
environmental concerns is weak - the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) was not
established until 2008, and remains largely "toothless" to this day (Wang and Wang 2011).
Economic Growth
It is clear that economic growth is China's top priority (Xinhua 2012). This priority
has thus far affected the way that environmental protection indicators are defined as well.
"Energy intensity", "carbon intensity", and "water intensity", indicators by which
quantitative environmental targets are allocated to sub-national governments, are all
defined in terms of units Gross Domestic Product (GDP). At first glance this seems a
salutary accounting for the environmental effects of economic growth, and indeed they are
enthusiastically touted as such by both government and civil society alike. However this
method also means that conservation of these resources is only officially supported when it
relates to economic growth; resources can continue to used at increasing rates yet appear
to decrease in intensity as long as the GDP figure at the bottom of the intensity ratio grows
faster. While accounting for resource use in national policymaking is a step in the right
direction, China still lacks a scientific method for allocating the targets (Ma, Can China Do A
Better Job Delegating Its 2015 Energy and Emissions Targets? 2011), and monitoring is still
dependent on inconsistent reporting by local governments. Meanwhile, experts estimate
that the relegation of environmental concerns to economic growth ironically undercuts the
economy by generating huge external costs: the cost of coal use was equal to 7.1 percent of
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GDP in 2007 (Mao, Sheng and Yang 2008), and cost of environmental degradation was
equal to 3.5 percent of GDP in 2010 (Wong, Cost of Environmental Damage in China
Growing Rapidly Amid Industrialization 2013).
Public Protests & Social Stability
The weak and elite-dominated landscape of environmental advocacy, along with
compromisingly defined, unscientifically allocated, and impossible to monitor
environmental indicators, combine to make China susceptible to environmental pollution
incidents both acute and chronic including since 2010: the Zijin Acid Leak (NRDC/IPE
2010), the Dalian Pipeline Explosion (Watts 2010), the Songhua Chemical Dump
(Bloomberg News 2010), the Dead Pigs Incident (Davison 2013), Cancer Villages (BBC
World 2013), etc. In the face of greater public knowledge and communication through
cellular technology and social media these large-scale pollution incidents have risen to the
fore of public anger, generating a 120 percent growth in environmental protests in the year
from 2010 to 2011 alone (Kennedy 2012). Some of these protests have seen success,
including the relocation of a chemical plant in Xiamen (Blount 2011), the suspension of a
factory project in Sichuan (Bradsher 2012), the disclosure of particulate matter with
diameter under 2.5 microns (PM2.5) by Beijing City (Caixin 2012), etc.
International Attention & Saving Face
Most recently, Beijing's infamous Beyond-Index Day (Economist 2013) triggered a
morbid worldwide fascination with China's pollution struggles, particularly the impact of
air pollution on public health. An estimated 1.2 million deaths in China in 2010 were
attributable to air pollution (Wong, Air Pollution Linked to 1.2 Million Premature Deaths in
China 2013), and birth defects in coal-polluted Shanxi Province are 18 times higher than in
the United States (Ren, et al. 2011). Anecdotal evidence suggests an exodus of talent from
China's major cities due to air pollution, particularly with parents concerned for the health
of their children (Wong, In China, Breathing Becomes a Childhood Risk 2013). Meanwhile,
an estimated 20-30 percent of air pollution in California can be traced to Asia (Cooper
2013), and Chinese air pollution is also shown to kill trees in Japan (Fackler 2013). It
remains to be seen if this heightened international attention will prompt China's leaders to
take its pollution issue more seriously, just as international pressure over energy and
climate issues has accelerated China's clean energy and low carbon policies in previous five
year plans. Indeed, the new Premier Keqiang Ll has already vowed to handle the pollution
problem with an "iron fist" (The Climate Group 2013).
Towards Transparency
The concerns around social stability, public health, economic damage, and
international pressure combine to elevate the pollution issue to the fore of China's
environmental concerns. However, solving China's localized pollution problems requires
new frameworks for managing information, measuring impacts, improving enforcement,
and empowering civil society watchdogs. The Beijing-based Institute for Public and
Environmental Affairs (IPE) plays a critical role in promoting environmental management
advancements along all these fronts.
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THE GREEN CHOICE ALLIANCE & IPE POLLUTION DATABASE
IPE heads a network of NGOs, called the Green Choice Alliance (GCA), that monitor
their local environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) for environmental information
disclosure from locations all over China. If any EPBs do not release information to a level
required of them by the China State Council's Regulations on Open Government
Information and MEP's Trial Measures on Open Environmental Information, the local GCA
member will apply to the EPB for disclosure of the unreleased information. The collected
information is then delivered to IPE headquarters for aggregation and indexing in the
Pollution Database and Map, widely considered China's first and only Pollutant Release and
Transfer Registry (PRTR).
FIGURE 1. LOCATIONS OF GREEN CHOICE ALLIANCE PARTNERS
loan
This map shows the provinces (highlighted in yellow) with presence of Green Choice Alliance
partners. (IPE Website 2010)
THE POLLUTION INFORMATION TRANSPARENCY INDEX
Oftentimes the EPBs do not publish information on polluters, nor do they respond to
GCA applications for polluter information, which is a direct yet commonplace violation of
MEP policy. Other times a rare EPB may disclose information at a level above and beyond
what is required. Whatever the EPB performance, GCA members record the experience
using a special methodology for evaluating transparency. At the end of every year, IPE and
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the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) analyze these transparency ratings to
develop a ranking of China's 113 Key Environmental Protection Cities according to
environmental information transparency. This ranking is called the Pollution Information
Transparency Index (PITI), now in its fifth year. The PITI project receives 100+ media
coverage hits per annual publication, as well as marked attention from city mayors.
FIGURE 2. THE 113 KEY STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CITIEs EVALUATED IN THE PITI
(NRDC/IPE 2010)
REPORTING & ADVOCACY
Aside from maintaining the GCA, the pollution maps, and the PITI project, IPE also
plays a thinktank and environmental watchdog role through its own investigative reports.
The recent media frenzy against Foxconn's N-Hexane poisoning incidents in China - and
Apple Computers' generally irresponsible sourcing practices - was broken through IPE's
investigations and subsequent "Poison Apple" campaign (FON, IPE, Envirofriends, Nature
U, Nanjing Greenstone 2013). IPE personnel also speak frequently in public education
venues and host interns for training in their office. These are rare and valuable acts of
public service in a country where the platform for public engagement and understanding of
environmental protection activities is so lacking.
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FIGURE 3. SELECTION OF IPE REPORTS
iAipk9*Mfi
Top Row: 1) Water Footprint of China's Textile Industry; 2) Health & Environmental Impacts
from Lead Battery Manufacturing & Recycling in China; 3) China Air Quality Information
Transparency Index. Bottom Row: 1) The First PITI; 2) China Greening - The Emerging Role of
the Public; 3) Poison Apple Campaign Report #5. (IPE Website 2012)
In Support of Environmental Information Disclosure
Due to IPE's important role in promoting environmental protection, public
participation, and information disclosure, and because IPE is essentially the only source of
reliable information on factory-level pollution in China, I aim to utilize IPE's pollution
database in an independent research capacity for the following purposes:
GOAL 1. TEST IPE DATA
Test IPE's data and database practices for comprehensiveness of information and
ease of use, from the perspective of an independent researcher.
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GOAL 2. EXPERIMENT WITH CURRENT DATA CAPACITY
Utilize existing data from IPE and from official government publications, to
determine the detail and quality of experiments that can reasonably be conducted at the
data capacity level in China today. Goal 2 is detailed in Chapter 2: The Experiment.
GoAL 3. RECOMMEND NEXT STEPS
Provide feedback to IPE based on the testing conducted in Goal 1. Also, evaluate the
experiment conducted in Goal 2, to gauge the quality of data collection, data availability,
and the research that can arise out of such data, for both the IPE platform and China
overall. The ultimate goal of this study is to provide a vision for how to establish
information transparency in China, an undertaking that requires not just the hardware of
data collection infrastructure and exchange platforms, but also socio-economic software in
the form of accountability, incentives, and rule of law.
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Methodology
ABOUT THE DATASETS USED
I use three sets of data in this experiment: 1) the China Urban Statistical Yearbook
(CUSY) for the year 2010, published by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS); 2) the China
National Pollution Database for the year 2010, published by the Institute for Public and
Environmental Affairs (IPE); and 3) the China Pollution Information Transparency Index
(PITI) for the year 2010, jointly published by IPE and the Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC).
FIGURE 4. THREE DATASETS COMPRISE THE CHINA URBAN POLLUTION INTENSITY INDEX (CUPII)
CUPH
Pollution
IPE Pollution Information
Database Transparency
Index
IPE Pollution Database
The IPE Pollution Database is a corporate environmental performance database
found in the pollution mapping section of the IPE website. It lists all instances in which a
city's industrial units engage in polluting activities without prior approval by the local
Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB), as recorded by the EPB.
Even though this is a "pollution database", and even though I will refer to the data
derived from this database as "pollution" and "pollution intensity", it is important to note
that the pollution level recorded here is not the total amount of pollutants, but rather a
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figure that indicates failure of a city's industrial units to comply with the city's pollution
ordinances. Data on this "pollution" of all 113 Key State Environmental Protection Cities
exist in the IPE Pollution Database. I use only year 2010 data because CUSY, the official
urban data from NBS, only covers until 2010 at the time of this study (IPE data already
covers until present year 2013).
Pollution Information Transparency Index
The PITI is the "metadata" that accompanies the IPE Pollution Database. It scores
the "transparency" of all 113 Key State Environmental Protection Cities when releasing
pollution data. This "transparency" is scored on eight metrics, two of which ("records of
enterprise violations" and "public information requests") I use for this study. "Records of
enterprise violations", is the rating given to EPBs for disclosing pollution records. "Public
Information Requests", is the rating given to EPBs for how well they disclose pollution
records when a member of the public submits an information request application form.
China Urban Statistical Yearbook
The CUSY contains official government data on urban indicators as recorded by NBS
in 2011. This 2011 Yearbook reports urban development data for the year 2010, and
includes all 113 Key State Environmental Protection Cities.
THE CHINA URBAN POLLUTION INTENSITY INDEX
Embedded within China's resource intensity formulae for energy, carbon, and water
is the implication that economic growth is the basic criteria by which productive activities
should be judged. A growth-neutral view of resource intensity must be created to evaluate
accurately the sustainability of China's development path. In this section, I describe how
the three publicly available datasets mentioned above can be used to generate a China
Urban Pollution Intensity Index (CUPII) by which cities can be studied according to
pollution instances per industrial unit, as opposed to per unit GDP. The version of the CUPII
I develop in this experiment is preliminary, and it will be limited because both the quantity
and quality of the data available in China today are limited. However it will provide a
framework for thinking about how to design a value-neutral index, and reveal insights into
how China's environmental information tracking processes should be improved in order to
enable a more accurate analysis and better policymaking than without such a framework.
There is a distinct lack of available and dependable information on the quantity of
pollutants at factory, city, provincial, and national scales in China. For the CUPII, I develop a
methodology to fill this information gap by meshing disparate datasets from third-party
NGOs and also official sources. The pollution levels, along with the figures for "pollution
intensity" developed in this manner are approximations for, but likely do not perfectly
equal, real pollution levels and pollution intensities in China today. Rather, the pollution
intensities I developed are best for determining relative pollution management practices
among the 113 Key State Environmental Protection Cities, and can be a powerful way to
rank the cities, as well as to determine correlations between pollution intensity and other
urban indicators. The steps for creating this CUPII are as follows.
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STEP 1
Use the IPE Pollution Database to find reported pollution instances for all 113 cities
in the year 2010 at current transparency levels. Weigh these reported pollution instances
by the 2010 PITI transparency ratings for each city, to find pollution instances for all 113
cities in the year 2010 at a projected 100% transparency level.
The formula for doing this is: [(CityTransparency)/46=(CityReported)/total], where
46=maximum transparency rating for metric 1 and metric 8 in the PITI,
and total=estimated real violations per city in 2010.
STEP 2
Use CUSY to find the official number of industries for each of the 113 cities in the
year 2010. Divide total as calculated in Step 1 by this official count to determine intensity,
where intensity is the average rate of pollution instances per industrial unit per city in
2010.
STEP 3
Analyze intensity: rank the cities by level of pollution intensity; isolate the 20 cities
with highest (10) and lowest (10) pollution intensity, and map them to show patterns in
geographic location. Use statistical analysis to determine if there is correlation
between intensity and other indicators as reported in CUSY.
SELECTING INDICATORS FOR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The China Urban Statistical Yearbook (CUSY) published by the National Bureau of
Statistics (NBS) typically contains about 50 indicators of development. In this experiment I
use 24 indicators, some imported directly from the statistical yearbook, and some derived
from sections of the yearbook through simple calculations. The sections used are: CUSY2-1
(population), CUSY2-12 (urbanization), CUSY2-13 (GDP), CUSY2-15 & CUSY2-16 (industrial
breakdowns), CUSY2-23 (revenue breakdowns), CUSY2-31 (public services), CUSY2-36
(information), CUSY2-37 (resource use), CUSY2-40 (sustainable economy), and CUSY2-41
(industrial emissions).
I discuss the findings, including details of the individual indicators and results of the
statistical analysis, in the next section.
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Results
URBAN POLLUTION INTENSITY RANKING
FIGURE 5. 113 KEY STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CITIES RANKED FROM BEST TO WORST
POLLUTION INTENSITY
RANK CITY INTENSITY RANK CITY INTENSITY RANK CITY INTENSITY
1 Tai'an 0.7% 39 Nantong 6.5% 77 Xian 19.7%
2 Dabian 0.8% 40 Changsha 6.6% 78 Changde 20.1%
3 Yichang 1.1% 41 Tianjin 7.0% 79 Bao 20.2%
4 Weiha 1.3% 42 Fuzhou 7.0% 80 Xuzhou 22.0%
5 Jiuliang 1.4% 43 Qingdao 7.3% 81 Benxi 22.4%
6 Xiamen 1.5% 44 Rizhao 7.3% $2 Ordos 23.6%
7 Hefei 16% 45 Wenzhou 7.4% 83 Dongguan 23.7%
8 Nanchang 1.7% 46 Jilin 7.6% 84 Quanzhou 24.2%
9 Zhuhai 1.7% 47 Yangzhou 7.7% 85 Hangzhou 26.2%
10 Yantai 1.7% 48 Suzhou 8.5% 86 Hohhot 27.0%
11 Anshan 1.9% 49 Shaoxing 8.6% 87 Jinzhou 27.5%
12 Jinan 2.1% 50 Guangzhou 8.6% 88 Jiaozuo 30.6%
13 Wuhu 2.7% 51 Foshan 9.1% 89 Tangshan 31.4%
14 Xiangtan 2.9% 52 Manyang 9.2% 90 kUrnq 31.5%
is Qujing 3.0% 53 Baoding 9.3% 91 Qinhangdao 31.8%
16 Yueyang 3.2% 54 Changzhou 9.3% 92 Panzhihua 34.1%
17 Changchun 3.2% 55 Shantou 9.6% 93 Mudanjiang 37.8%
18 Jning 3.5% 56 Chifeng 9.7% 94 Nanjing 39.6%
19 Wuhan 3.7% 57 Maanshan 10.8% 95 Zunyi 39.8%
20 Huzhou 3.9% 58 Kunming 11.2% 96 Ketamayi 42.7%
21 Zaozhuang 4.1% 59 Weltang 11.5% 97 Guiyang 48.2%
22 Jiaxing 4.3% 60 Chngng 11.9% 98 Handan 48.7%
23 Jinzhou 4.4% 61 Yancheng 12.5% 99 Luoyan 52.2%
24 Zibo 4.6% 62 Baotou 13.3% 100 Beihai 61.7%
25 harbin 4.7% 63 Fushun 13.3% 101 YIbin 64.0%
26 Zhuzhou 4.9% 64 Nanning 13.6% 102 Yan'an 70.4%
27 Zhangliaise 5.3% 65 Lanzhou 14.4% 103 Changzhi 72.0%
28 Nigbo 5.4% 66 Luzhou 14.6% 104 Datong 77.5%
29 Shenyang 5.5% 67 Kaiteng 14.6% 105 Taiyuan 115.2%
30 Anyang 5.6% 68 Dqng 14.7% 106 X gning 116.7%
31 Zhengzhou 5.7% 69 Beijing 14.7% 107 Linfen 126.9%
32 Chengdu 5.7% 70 Xianyang 15.0% 108 Tongchuan 127.9%
33 Zhongshan 5.7% 71 P 15.9% 109 Shijazhuang 145.3%
34 Lluzhou 5.9% 72 Lianyungang 16.7% 110 Yangquan 164.9%
35 Taizhou 6.2% 73 Shaoguan 16.8% 111 Shizuishan 170.2%
16 Shenzhen 6.3% 74 Qiq er 18.1% 112 Yinchuan 190.4%
37 Shanghai 6.4% 75 WuxI 18.5% 113 J lnchang 298.7%
38 GuNin 6.4% 76 Zhanjiang 19.5% 1 _ 1
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URBAN POLLUTION INTENSITY STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
NEGATIVE CORRELATION
Four indicators are negatively correlated with pollution intensity:
Density 2, Gross Regional Product3 , and Investment in Science & Technology4.
FIGURE 6. URBAN INDICATORS NEGATIVELY CORRELATED WITH POLLUTION INTENSITY
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That is: more people, higher density, higher gross regional product, and higher
investment in science and technology initiatives are all factors related to a city having
fewer instances of pollution not previously approved by the local EPB. The opposite is true:
fewer people, lower density, lower gross regional product, and lower investment in science
and technology initiatives are all factors related to a city having more instances of pollution
not previously approved by the local EPB.
1 I define the Population indicator CUSY2-1 (coded "pop") as people per city's municipal
area measured at the end of 2010.
2 1 define the Density indicator CUSY2-12 (coded "density") as number of people per square
kilometer residing in the municipal area.
3 1 define the Gross Regional Product indicator CUSY2-13 (coded "GRP") as total value of
production for the municipal area in the year 2010.
41 derive the Investment in Science & Technology indicator (coded "expendscitech") from
CUSY2-23 by dividing the amount of Chinese Yuan (CNY) spent on "Science & Technology"
programming for each municipal area in the year 2010 by the total amount of city
expenditures for each municipal area, then multiplying by 100 to find percent.
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POSITIVE CORRELATION
Six indicators are positively correlated with pollution intensity: Domestic Industry 5,
Average Per-Industrial Unit Effluent Standard 6 , Average Air Pollution Removed Per
Industrial Unit 7, Average Air Pollution Emitted Per Industrial Unit8 , Average C02 Removal
Per Industrial Unit 9, and Average C02 Emissions Per Industrial Unit10 .
s I derive the Domestic Industry indicator (coded "sharedomestic") from CUSY2-16 by
dividing the number of domestic industrial units by the number of total industrial units for
each municipal area in the year 2010, then multiplying by 100 to find percent. I use this
transformation to adjust for the different sizes of each city's industrial base (that is, two
cities that are equally balanced in domestic vs. foreign industry may have one city register
as hosting more domestic industry units if that city has more industrial units overall).
6 1 derive the Average Per-Industrial Unit Effluent Standard indicator (coded
"effluentstandavgper") from CUSY2-41 by dividing the municipal cap for industrial effluent
in tons by the number of industries in the municipal area. This transformation is to adjust
for the different sizes of each city's industrial base (that is, the same industrial effluent cap
applied to two cities with different levels of industrial activity actually indicates different
stringencies of industrial effluent standards).
7 I derive the Average Air Pollution Removed Per Industrial Unit indicator (coded
"indairremovavgper") from CUSY2-41 by dividing the total amount of "industrial smoke
and dust" removed from all industrial units in the municipal area in tons by the total
number of industries in the area. This transformation is to adjust for the different sizes of
each city's industrial base (that is, the same amount of air pollution removed reported by
two cities with different numbers of industrial units actually indicates different levels of
average air pollution removal).
8 1 derive the Average Air Pollution Emitted Per Industrial Unit indicator (coded
"indairemitavgper") from CUSY2-41 by dividing the total amount of "industrial smoke and
dust" emitted from all industrial units in the municipal area in tons by the total number of
industries in the area. This transformation is to adjust for the different sizes of each city's
industrial base (that is, the same amount of air pollution emissions reported by two cities
with different numbers of industrial units actually indicates different levels of average air
pollution emission).
9 1 derive the Average C02 Removal Per Industrial Unit indicator (coded
"indco2removavgper") from CUSY2-41 by dividing the total amount of C02 removed by all
industrial units in the municipal area in tons by the total number of industries in the area.
This transformation is to adjust for the different sizes of each city's industrial base (that is,
the same amount of C02 removal reported by two cities with different numbers of
industrial units actually indicates different levels of average carbon reduction achieved).
10 1 derive the Average C02 Emissions Per Industrial Unit indicator (coded
"indco2emitavgper") from CUSY2-41 by dividing the total amount of C02 emitted from all
industrial units in the municipal area in tons by the total number of industries in the area.
This transformation is to adjust for the different sizes of each city's industrial base (that is,
the same amount of C02 emissions reported by two cities with different numbers of
industrial units actually indicates different levels of average carbon emissions).
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FIGURE 7. URBAN INDICATORS POSITIVELY CORRELATED WITH POLLUTION INTENSITY
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A Note On CO2
Although the correlation between Average C02 Removal Per Industrial Unit and
Pollution Intensity is positively correlated at the 95% confidence interval according to the
outputs of the statistical analysis (Appendix I), creating a plot of the fitted line against the
data points shows that there is an outlier city. Referring back to CUSY2-41 shows that
Jinchang, the worst-rated city in the Pollution Intensity Rankings (Figure 1), reported an
incredibly high amount of C02 removed: 1,184,058 tons. In contrast, the next highest
amount of C02 removed was 962,388 tons, reported by Chongqing which has 7,130
industrial units vs. Yinchang's 55. After dividing C02 removed by total industrial units to
calculate the Average C0 2 Removal Per Industrial Unit indicator, Yinchang's amount
becomes an obvious outlier. To deal with what is likely a reporting error on the part of the
Yinchang EPB, I ran a second round of analysis with maxima and minima dropped for this
indicator.
There is a similar outlier city in the plot of Average C02 Emissions Per Industrial
Unit on Pollution Intensity, and referring back to CUSY2-41 shows that once again Yinchang
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reported an incredibly high amount of C0 2 emissions. I ran a second round of analysis with
maxima and minima dropped for this indicator. Average CO2 Emissions Per Industrial Unit
is still positively correlated with Pollution Intensity in this second analysis.
Average CO2 Removal and Emissions Per Industrial Unit are both still positively
correlated with Pollution Intensity after dropping maxima and minima.
FIGURE 8. AVERAGE CO 2 REMOVAL AND EMISSIONS PER INDUSTRIAL UNIT WITH MAXIMA &
MINIMA DROPPED
NO CORRELATION
Fourteen indicators showed no correlation with pollution intensity at the 95%
confidence interval. These are: Per Capita Gross Regional Product"1, Gross Regional
Product Growth Rate 12, Urban Built Rate 13, Government Revenues 14 , Government
Expenditures 1-, Investment in Education16, Public Library Books Per Capita , Internet
11 1 define the Per Capita Gross Regional Product indicator CUSY2-13 (coded "GRPPC") as
average production value in CNY per person in the municipal area.
12 I define the Gross Regional Product Growth Rate indicator CUSY2-13 (coded "GRPGR") as
percent rate of growth of total production value in CNY for the year 2010 in the municipal
area.
13 1 define the Urban Built Rate indicator CUSY2-12 (coded "ratebuilt") as urban
constructed land area as percent of total urban land area for the municipal area.
141I define the Government Revenues indicator CUSY2-23 (coded "revenues") as amount
CNY listed in the city budget as revenues for the year 2010.
is 1 define the Government Expenditures indicator CUSY2-23 (coded "expenditures") as
amount CNY listed in the city budget as expenditures for the year 2010.
161I derive the Investment in Education indicator (coded "expendedu") from CUSY2-23 by
dividing the amount Chinese Yuan (CNY) spent on "Education" programming for each
municipal area in the year 2010 by the total amount of city expenditures for each municipal
area, then multiplying by 100 to find percent. This transformation is to adjust for the
different sizes of each city's expenditures coffer (that is, two cities that equally emphasize
education in their development strategies may have one city that registers as spending
more on educational programming if that city has more expenditures overall).
21
Connections Per Capita18 , Value Generated Through Circular Economy Activities 19, Total
City-Wide Electricity Use 20 , Total Electricity Used by Industrial Units 21 , Share of Total
Electricity Attributable to Industrial Use 22, Total City-Wide Water Use 2 3 , and Share of City-
Wide Water Use Attributable to Residential Uses2 4 .
17 define the Public Library Books Per Capita indicator CUSY2-31 (coded "PLbooksPC") as
books available per person in the public library systems of each municipal area.
18 1 derive the Internet Connections Per Capita indicator CUSY2-31 (coded "internetPC")
from CUSY2-36 by dividing the number of households with internet connections in the
municipal area by the total municipal population to arrive at an indicator of internet access
that adjusts for population (that is, two cities with the same number of internet
connections may still see one city as relatively lacking internet access if that city has a
greater number of people overall and therefore a greater share of people not connected to
the internet).
191 define the Value Generated Through Circular Economy Activities indicator CUSY2-40
(coded "threewastesval") as value in CNY of "Value Generated by Production From
Comprehensive Reuse of Three Wastes" for the year 2010 in the municipal area. "Circular
Economy" seems to be the best way to describe this indicator, though it is unclear from the
CUSY data if there is any relationship between the "Comprehensive Reuse of Three Wastes"
and the official policy promoting Circular Economy, as there is no meta-data available to
inform the user how the indicators are derived and where the figures come from.
20 I define the Total City-wide Electricity Use indicator CUSY2-37 (coded "electricusetot")
as total amount of electricity in kilowatt-hours used by the city for the year 2010.
21 1 define the City-Wide Electricity Used by Industrial Units indicator CUSY2-37 (coded
"indelectricusetot") as the total amount of electricity in kilowatt-hours used by the city's
industries during the year 2010.
22 1 derive the Share of Total Electricity Attributable to Industrial Use indicator (coded
"indelectricuseshare") from CUSY2-37 by dividing the total amount of electricity in
kilowatt-hours used by industries by the total amount of electricity used for all purposes in
the municipal area for the year 2010. This transformation is to adjust for total electricity
demand (that is, two cities with the same amount of industrial electricity use may still have
different residential to industrial electricity use ratios, and this needs to be captured).
23 1 define the Total City-wide Water Use indicator CUSY2-37 (coded "waterusetot") as total
water supplied for all uses in tons for the year 2010 in the municipal area.
24 I derive the Share of City-Wide Water Use Attributable to Residential Uses indicator
(coded "sharewateruseres") from CUSY2-37 by dividing the total amount of water in tons
supplied for residential uses divided by the total amount of water in tons supplied for all
uses in the municipal area for the year 2010. This transformation is to adjust for total water
demand (that is, two cities with the same amount of total amount of water supplied for
residential uses may still have different residential to industrial water use ratios, and this
needs to be captured).
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FIGURE 9. URBAN INDICATORs NOT CORRELATED WITH POLLUTION INTENSITY
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Analysis
POLLUTION INTENSITY
A few interesting findings can be noted from the pollution intensity ratings and
rankings presented in Figure 5.
The most obvious is that the nine worst ranked cities (Jinchang, Yinchuan,
Shizuishan, Yangquan, Shijiazhuang, Tongchuan, Linfen, Xining, and Taiyuan) all scored
above 100% in the pollution intensity index. In reality there would not be a city with
pollution intensity over one hundred percent, as that entails there are more polluting
industries in the city than there are industries. This speaks to existing errors and
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inaccuracies in the stock data I used to conduct this experiment, which I will discuss in
Chapter 3: Key Findings.
Isolating the 20 cities that scored the lowest (Best 10) and highest (Worst 10) in the
Pollution Intensity Index reveals that there may be geographical patterns in city
performance. It seems that the Best 10 tend to be more coastal, and the Worst 10 tend to be
more inland. In Figure 11 I show with a map of the 10 Best and 10 Worst performing cities
that this is indeed the case.
FIGURE 10. BEST AND WORST CITIES RANKING, POLLUTION INTENSITY
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Best 10
1. Tai'an
2. Dalian
3. Yichang
4. Weihai
5. Jiujiang
6. Xiamen
I7. Hefei
8. Nanchang
9. Zhuhai
10. Yantai
Worst 10
1. Jinchang
2. Yinchuan
3. Shizuishan
4. Yangquan
s. Shijiazhuang
6. Tongchuan
7. Linfen
8. Xining
9. Taiyuan
10. Datong
..... .......
FIGURE 11. GEOGRAPHY OF BEST AND WORST CITIES, POLLUTION INTENSITY
In fact the geographic component of performance disparity is even more severe than
I anticipated. Not only are the 10 Best cities all nearer the coast than the 10 Worst, all but
one (Yichang) of the 10 Best are linked to one of China's major economic development
zones: Tai'an, Dalian, Weihai, and Yantai are part of the Bohai Economic Rim Development
Zone; Jiujiang, Hefei, and Nanchang are part of the Pan-Yangtze River Delta Economic
Development Region; Xiamen and Zhuhai are located along the Pan-Pearl River Delta
Economic Development Chain. The top-performing province is Shandong with three of the
Best 10 Cities (Tai'an, Weihai, and Yantai). In Contrast, All of the Worst 10 performing cities
are located inland, in the heart of the Greater North China Plains Region. The bottom-
performing province is Shanxi with four of the Worst 10 Cities (Yangquan, Linfen, Taiyuan,
and Datong). Figure 12 shows the map again with all cities labeled.
Mapping the Worst 10 cities clearly shows that in 2010 the North China Plains was
already a severe pollution hotspot housing the country's worst and most unmanageable
polluting industries. This problem was finally revealed in 2013 when the Chinese Academy
of Geological Sciences found that 77.8 percent of the groundwater in the North china Plains
region is polluted beyond the possibility of direct consumption without treatment. 56.6
percent is severely polluted and can only be used "after additional special treatment" (Guo
2013). In response to this pollution emergency, China's national government established a
North China Plains Groundwater Pollution Prevention and Control plan and working group.
This effort requires the involvement of four ministries; its research phase alone will run
until 2015 and monitoring of groundwater pollution is not slated to begin until 2020 (W.
Wu 2013).
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FIGURE 12. GEOGRAPHY OF BEST AND WORST CITIES, LABELED
A national database and system that tracks regional disparities in pollution
management, like the China Urban Pollution Intensity Index, could have caught the North
China Plains pollution hotspot problem much earlier, perhaps when it first arose. What
should have cost a relatively small amount of pollution prevention effort has, in the
absence of information transparency, grown into an emergency situation that requires
massive deployment of human, capital, and time resources at a national level.
Every day sees the possibility of new pollution hotspots developing, and as in the
case of the North China Plains, left unchecked these hotspots may grow into future national
emergencies. China needs to break the mold of responding to environmental problems
when there is already little recourse. Information collection, monitoring, and disclosure
practices need to be developed at all levels to promote pollution prevention, not just
pollution control.
URBAN INDICATORS
The urban indicators from CUSY that are statistically correlated with pollution
intensity seem to make intuitive sense. A higher residential population housed in a denser
more urban environment, greater gross regional product, and higher levels of city
investment in scientific and technological programs are characteristics of a more
developed city with more economic diversity than cities that are relatively dependent on
heavier industries. Other studies in the energy field confirm that economically diverse
cities in China are more likely to exhibit greater levels of urban sustainability, particularly
in the form of less energy intensive production patterns (Xu, et al. 2002).
In contrast, domestic industries are associated with lower levels of urban
sustainability in the form of more energy-intensive production patterns (He and Wang
2007) and worse industrial productivity overall. This also makes sense in the light of
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pollution intensity's positive correlation with the Domestic Industry indicator, as well as
higher levels of C0 2 activities, higher levels of air pollution activities, and the need for more
stringent effluent standards, which are all indicators of more active industries.
FIGURE 13. SIGNIFICANT AND INSIGNIFICANT INDICATORS
Significant
Population ()
Density (-)
GRP (- )
Domestic industry (+
Scitech Investments(-
Effluent Standards 4+)
C02 Prevention (+)
C02 Emissions (+)
Air Pollution Prevention (+)
Air Pollution Emissions (+)
insignificant
U1rb an Bwt Rate
Government Revenues
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The urban indicators from CUSY that showed no significant correlation with
pollution intensity were less intuitive. Government Revenues and Government
Expenditures, for example, determine what resources a city can access when managing
environmental information, and a 2010 study shows a link between these two indicators
and a city's PITI score (Lorentzen, Landry and Yasuda 2010).
Indicators directly related to industrial production activities, like Share of Industrial
Electricity Use and Share of Residential Water Use (selected because it is the inverse to the
share of industrial water use) also would seem to have some correlation with pollution
intensity. The Industrial Electricity Use indicator in particular was selected as a proxy for
energy, with the hypothesis that a city with an industrial base that uses more energy will
likely generate more pollution and more pollution intensity. The lack of correlation
between electricity use by industrial units and pollution intensity should not be taken as a
lack of correlation between energy and pollution - energy pollutes more in its coal form
than its electricity form, but unfortunately there is no indicator within CUSY for industrial
coal use. It is worth noting that four of the ten cities as Worst Pollution Intensity (Figure
10) are located in Shanxi Province, where much of China's coal is produced.
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Key Finding 1: China's Existing Data Framework is
Rudimentary, Piecemeal, and Inaccurate.
RUDIMENTARY
Official government data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) is collected
and shared in a very rudimentary manner in terms of both availability and accessibility.
The experiment conducted here is undertaken halfway through 2013, and ideally should
have used urban data for the year 2012. However, NBS urban data only runs up to the 2011
report, which covers 2010 data. In contrast, IPE released full 2012 pollution transparency
index data in March of 2013, a lag time of only 3 months versus the NBS lag time of 2 years.
The NBS data that is available is difficult to access. In principle the public should be
able to download official NBS data from the NBS website at stats.gov.cn, but the download
links are broken, rendering the service unusable. Upon consulting with a data engineer, I
found that the links can be fixed (or "hacked") through Google Chrome's Website Inspector
feature by editing the page elements to undo a line of code that prevents the linked folding
lists from displaying, but this is hardly common knowledge. The design of the page impedes
access by the general public.
FIGURE 14. SCREENSHOT OF NBS NATIONAL STATISTICAL YEARBOOK WEBPAGE
Moy LIghtO Chn UeletVloa reeAllrgt eevd
Nepr o b pbleie ayb epouedo rNeml
All download links in leftframe are broken. (NBS 2011)
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PIECEMEAL
Nationally, China's State Council has required disclosure of government information
since 2008. However, it is the local governments that are responsible for fulfilling this
disclosure requirement. Without more detailed local laws and supporting mechanisms, the
disclosure practices differ widely by locality and the overall performance of the disclosure
policy is piecemeal at best.
The Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI)'s transparency ratings for the
113 Key State Environmental Protection Cities clearly illustrate this point. Figure 14 shows
that compliance differs according to geographic location. Figure 15 shows that in 2010,
only the top 11 cities received passing scores for transparency (if non-passing is defined as
receiving an "F" grade scoring in the 50-60 out of 100 range or lower), so compliance is
extremely lacking.
FIGURE 15. REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE PRACTICES
132 2009-2010 Average Score
(NRDC/IPE 2010)
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IN ACCURATE
The lack of uniform disclosure across localities also gives rise to quality control
issues during data collection and reporting, making the stock of China's official data
ultimately inaccurate. The issue with Yichang's reported amounts for C02 reduction and
emissions, which I found problematic during my analysis (discussed in previous "A Note on
C02" section), is a more obvious example of one such inaccuracy. Other inaccuracies exist,
notably within energy data (Ma, China's Statistical Challenges Stymie Accountable
Development 2011). The results from research conducted with skewed data cannot help
but be skewed as well. If China is to improve the efficacy of its data-backed policymaking, it
must first improve the accuracy of its stock data.
Key Finding 2: It is difficult for A Nongovernmental
Organization to Provide Comprehensive Data without
Government Support.
The Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE) is unrivaled as a central
repository for pollution information disclosed locally by the Environmental Protection
Bureaus (EPBs), and IPE's advocacy work in encouraging EPBs to disclose information is
one of their important contributions to the field. However, the fact remains that the
accuracy and comprehensiveness of IPE data is dependent upon the accuracy and
comprehensiveness of local EPB disclosure practices. My experiment attempted to account
for this shortcoming by weighing local EPB data with ratings of local EPB transparency
levels, but that is far from ideal. Though the pollution intensities calculated in this way are
closer to the true pollution intensities than simply using unweighted EPB data alone, there
are clearly still errors (an example as mentioned earlier is that nine cities had pollution
intensities over 100 percent, which is not possible in reality).
A national pollution database, in the form of a Pollutant Release and Transfer
Registry (PRTR) as exists in other countries, should record total amount of pollutants
released for all major industrial units, not just instances of pollution violations as the IPE
database records. However a true PRTR requires an overhaul of how pollution is defined
and tracked by all EPBs in China, which is not something that IPE can achieve alone.
Key Finding 3: China's Current Government Information
Collection Lacks Both Data and Metadata.
Within the China Urban Statistical Yearbook (CUSY), there are indicators that touch
on important development themes but do not track them in enough detail. The number of
library books a city provides per capita, for example, is a minor indicator but it was
included in this study because Library Books, along with Number of Theaters, are the only
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indicators given within CUSY for a category called "Culture". "Culture" is difficult to
quantify, and even if quantified by indicators like books and theaters it is then difficult to
gauge the accessibility of these goods and facilities to different members of the public.
However "Culture" is an important component of urban development.
Another example is number of Internet connections a city has per capita. This
indicator was included in the study with the hypothesis that access to information
empowers citizens to taken more initiative in their local communities, yielding a diversity
of positive impacts including perhaps the watchdogging of polluters. The fact that there is
no statistical correlation between Internet connections and the city's instances of pollution
not previously approved by the local EPB is interesting but should not be taken to infer
anything about the relationship between access to information and citizen engagement.
Like the library books indicator, the existence of an Internet hookup does not imply access
(the internet itself may be blocked, for example), nor does it imply access to the right
information (particularly in cities receiving low scores on the PITI because they fail to
publish polluter information on the internet).
While indicators like GDP and population are easy to measure and explain,
indicators like culture and information are just as important to track for policymaking
purposes. NBS needs to assign more indicators for these themes, and also needs to
introduce metadata to accompany data points that may not be as easy to understand due to
lack of universal definition. Currently NBS's lack of metadata defining its more complicated
urban indicators causes confusion, such as the "Circular Economy" indicator previously
discussed in Chapter 2.
Key Finding 4: It is possible to utilize existing data for national
policymaking despite shortcomings.
Despite the challenges in data quality and comprehensiveness noted in Key Findings
1-3, it is important to note that in my experiment, I was still able to generate interesting
results with useful implications for policy analysis. The results confirm that higher levels of
urbanization are correlated with lower levels of pollution intensity, likely through the
greater economic diversity present in urban settings. The results also confirm that there
are obvious regional disparities in pollution intensity that follow the classic pattern of the
eastern coastal regions developing at the expense of inland regions.
Perhaps most interestingly, my analysis of the pollution-intensity ratings showed
that developing a national pollution-intensity index would make possible more timely
identification of pollution hotspots in China. As in the case of the North China Plains
groundwater pollution crisis, identifying the problem years earlier will enable proactive
investments in pollution prevention as opposed to the current (expensive and less
effective) method of ex post facto pollution control and response.
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In this study I provided an experimental look at China's environmental management
disparities across different cities and regions, at current information transparency levels. I
also presented a vision of a more open China, and discussed how information transparency
can improve China's environment, governance, research capacity, and development path.
Information transparency is the only way to enable well-informed decisions and balanced
action at all levels; more than anything information transparency is about growing the
seeds of trust in a suspicious society, because without trust there is no cooperation and no
real harmony.
Vision for Urban Pollution Management
Any city that depends on industrial production as part of its income and jobs
generation will have to contend with pollution. What separates a city that manages its
pollution and a city that falls victim to its pollution is a strong system of permits,
monitoring, reporting, and enforcement.
PERMITS
The city must start with an overall pollution management strategy that clearly sets
forth the amount of pollution that can be taken on by the urban environment without
resulting in harm to ecology and public health. This amount is then allocated to industrial
units in the form of a pollution permit. Pollution permits should contain detailed limits for
pollutants, guidelines on how the limits are to be achieved, and monitoring and
enforcement protocol.
MONITORING
After the permits are given, the receiving facilities must install monitoring
equipment and allocate personnel to ensure that the permit terms are upheld at all times.
REPORTING
Data collected during the Monitoring phase must be reported through secure
channels back to the responsible parties within the EPBs. The EPBs must then aggregate
and disclose the data in a publicly accessible venue. This requires EPB personnel and likely
a software platform.
ENFORCEMENT
When industries violate permit terms, enforcement must occur typically in the form
of a fee. The fee must be larger than the benefit derived by the industry for their violation.
This requires enforcement personnel either within the EPB or the local law-enforcement
agency.
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CURRENT URBAN POLLUTION MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
Unfortunately, few if any cities in China have the will or capacity to implement the
entire pollution management process described above. Permits are vulnerable to
unscientific allocation and negotiation. Typically, the permits themselves are merely
certificates designating permission to pollute, with none of the necessary guidelines.
Performance monitoring is largely based on self-reporting, which is prone to mis-reporting.
The EPBs do not uniformly disclose the collected information. Enforcement also varies,
particularly depending on the political clout of the industry in question, and enforcement
fees are often too low to discourage pollution.
The quality of China's urban-level pollution data is challenged at every step of the
way in the pollution-management process, and there cannot be truly informed decision-
making until this issue is resolved.
Lessons for National/International Policy
The pollution issue in China is too large for the national government to tackle alone.
It requires participation from citizens, researchers, and enterprises, but this participation
is dependent on a level of access to information that does not yet exist. Though the IPE
database is an important first step in collecting and releasing this information for public
use, the quality of the data is compromised by unscientific non-uniform collection at the
urban and regional level.
If the national government does not intend to take over its natural role as provider
of a PRTR system for China, it must at least structure its policies to support urban-level
improvements in data collection and transfer, so that an NGO like IPE can take over this
important work. Passing the 2008 State Council Measures on Open Government
Information is not enough - there must be mechanisms deployed at a local level to support
implementation of the Measures; in particular there must be funding for developing the
technical capacity, for paying the necessary personnel, for trainings and public education
campaigns, etcetera. If the national government does not wish to take responsibility for
managing and paying for all the pollution management mechanisms required at all levels, it
must at least cede to local governments the ability to raise and allocate funding for this
important work.
There is a pollution crisis in China, a problem so large and complicated it can only be
resolved when the entire society participates. There are other crises as well, in water
scarcity, in energy, in public health, in education, in all aspects of society, and all such
problems are solved faster and solved more completely when more parties become
involved through access to the necessary information. The best time for installing
information transparency mechanisms in China was 5,000 years ago. The second best time
is today.
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Result 1.
. regress intensity pop
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 113
F( 1, 111) = 6.74
Model 13285.6012 1 13285.6012 Prob > F = 0.0107
Residual 218761.387 111 1970.8233 R-squared = 0.0573
Adj R-squared = 0.0488
Total 232046.988 112 2071.84811 Root MSE = 44.394
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
pop -2.83e-06 1.09e-06 -2.60 0.011 -4.99e-06 -6.71e-07
_cons 42.38984 7.100076 5.97 0.000 28.32056 56.45911
Result 2.
. regress intensity density
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 113
F( 1, 111) = 9.69
Model 18627.07 1 18627.07 Prob > F = 0.0024
Residual 213419.918 111 1922.70196 R-squared = 0.0803
Adj R-squared = 0.0720
Total 232046.988 112 2071.84811 Root MSE = 43.849
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>ItI [95% Conf. Interval]
density -.0334263 .0107392 -3.11 0.002 -.0547068 -.0121459
_cons 45.41353 7.08564 6.41 0.000 31.37287 59.4542
38
Result 3.
regress intensity GRP
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 113
F( 1, 111) = 6.96
Model 13697.1652 1 13697.1652 Prob > F = 0.0095
Residual 218349.823 111 1967.11552 R-squared = 0.0590
Adj R-squared = 0.0506
Total 232046.988 112 2071.84811 Root MSE = 44.352
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
GRP -4.03e-11 1.53e-11 -2.64 0.010 -7.06e-11 -1.00e-11
_cons 38.20038 5.823096 6.56 0.000 26.66153 49.73924
Result 4.
regress intensity sharedomestic
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 113
F( 1, 111) = 7.06
Model 13880.0644 1 13880.0644 Prob > F = 0.0090
Residual 218166.923 111 1965.46778 R-squared = 0.0598
Adj R-squared = 0.0513
Total 232046.988 112 2071.84811 Root MSE = 44.334
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
sharedomesc .8824125 .3320541 2.66 0.009 .2244251 1.5404
_cons -49.81439 29.38414 -1.70 0.093 -108.041 8.41225
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Result 5.
regress intensity expendscitech
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 113
F( 1, 111) = 8.62
Model 16724.3303 1 16724.3303 Prob > F = 0.0040
Residual 215322.658 111 1939.84376 R-squared = 0.0721
Adj R-squared = 0.0637
Total 232046.988 112 2071.84811 Root MSE = 44.044
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>jt| [95% Conf. Interval]
expendscit-h -8.22722 2.801961 -2.94 0.004 -13.77949 -2.674947
_cons 43.58577 6.873721 6.34 0.000 29.96503 57.2065
Result 6.
regress intensity effluentstandavgper
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 112
F( 1, 110) = 20.88
Model 36938.4211 1 36938.4211 Prob > F = 0.0000
Residual 194636.993 110 1769.42721 R-squared = 0.1595
Adj R-squared = 0.1519
Total 231575.414 111 2086.26499 Root MSE = 42.065
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>ItI [95% Conf. Interval]
effluentst-r .0003611 .000079 4.57 0.000 .0002045 .0005178
_cons 4.004633 6.529657 0.61 0.541 -8.935614 16.94488
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w........... 
Result 7.
regress intensity indco2removavgper
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 111
F( 1, 109) = 61.79
Model 83650.4836 1 83650.4836 Prob > F = 0.0000
Residual 147558.315 109 1353.74601 R-squared = 0.3618
Adj R-squared = 0.3559
Total 231208.798 110 2101.89817 Root MSE = 36.793
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>|tj [95% Conf. Interval]
indco2remo-r .0134712 .0017137 7.86 0.000 .0100746 .0168677
_cons 23.27177 3.54042 6.57 0.000 16.25477 30.28877
Result 8.
regress intensity indco2emitavgper
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 111
F( 1, 109) = 120.53
Model 121410.508 1 121410.508 Prob > F = 0.0000
Residual 109798.291 109 1007.32377 R-squared = 0.5251
Adj R-squared = 0.5208
Total 231208.798 110 2101.89817 Root MSE = 31.738
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
indco2emit-r .186756 .017011 10.98 0.000 .1530407 .2204714
_cons 9.122282 3.461759 2.64 0.010 2.261188 15.98338
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Result 9.
regress intensity indairremovavgper
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 111
F( 1, 109) = 31.00
Model 51197.3623 1 51197.3623 Prob > F = 0.0000
Residual 180011.436 109 1651.48106 R-squared = 0.2214
Adj R-squared = 0.2143
Total 231208.798 110 2101.89817 Root MSE = 40.638
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
indairremo-r .0052886 .0009498 5.57 0.000 .003406 .0071711
_cons 17.72306 4.264262 4.16 0.000 9.271433 26.17469
Result 10.
regress intensity indairemitavgper
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 111
F( 1, 109) = 59.87
Model 81968.0118 1 81968.0118 Prob > F = 0.0000
Residual 149240.787 109 1369.18153 R-squared = 0.3545
Adj R-squared = 0.3486
Total 231208.798 110 2101.89817 Root MSE = 37.002
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
indairemit-r .4947143 .0639385 7.74 0.000 .3679902 .6214384
_cons 12.68069 4.022038 3.15 0.002 4.709142 20.65224
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Result 11.
regress intensity ratebuilt
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 111
F( 1, 109) = 0.00
Model 7.05854383 1 7.05854383 Prob > F = 0.9541
Residual 231225.644 109 2121.33618 R-squared = 0.0000
Adj R-squared = -0.0091
Total 231232.702 110 2102.11548 Root MSE = 46.058
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>jtj [95% Conf. Interval]
ratebuilt .0204794 .3550293 0.06 0.954 -.6831771 .7241359
_cons 27.58193 6.271996 4.40 0.000 15.15104 40.01282
Result 12.
regress intensity GRPPC
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 113
F( 1, 111) = 2.46
Model 5026.53435 1 5026.53435 Prob > F = 0.1198
Residual 227020.454 111 2045.22931 R-squared = 0.0217
Adj R-squared = 0.0128
Total 232046.988 112 2071.84811 Root MSE = 45.224
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
GRPPC -.000256 .0001633 -1.57 0.120 -.0005795 .0000676
_cons 39.32058 8.66773 4.54 0.000 22.1449 56.49627
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Result 13.
. regress intensity GRPGR
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 113
F( 1, 111) = 0.01
Model 29.996322 1 29.996322 Prob > F = 0.9049
Residual 232016.992 111 2090.24317 R-squared = 0.0001
Adj R-squared = -0.0089
Total 232046.988 112 2071.84811 Root MSE = 45.719
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
GRPGR -.2841488 2.371976 -0.12 0.905 -4.984377 4.416079
_cons 31.47235 33.59014 0.94 0.351 -35.08877 98.03346
Result 14.
. regress intensity revenues
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 113
F( 1, 111) = 3.44
Model 6979.84951 1 6979.84951 Prob > F = 0.0662
Residual 225067.138 111 2027.63188 R-squared = 0.0301
Adj R-squared = 0.0213
Total 232046.988 112 2071.84811 Root MSE = 45.029
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>jt| [95% Conf. Interval]
revenues -2.03e-10 1.09e-10 -1.86 0.066 -4.20e-10 1.38e-11
_cons 32.30736 4.970801 6.50 0.000 22.45739 42.15734
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Result 15.
. regress intensity expenditures
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 113
F( 1, 111) = 3.58
Model 7241.42662 1 7241.42662 Prob > F = 0.0612
Residual 224805.561 111 2025.27533 R-squared = 0.0312
Adj R-squared = 0.0225
Total 232046.988 112 2071.84811 Root MSE = 45.003
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
expenditures -1.80e-10 9.50e-11 -1.89 0.061 -3.68e-10 8.61e-12
_cons 33.30846 5.236282 6.36 0.000 22.93242 43.6845
Result 16.
. regress intensity expendedu
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 113
F( 1, 111) = 0.43
Model 897.783917 1 897.783917 Prob > F = 0.5128
Residual 231149.204 111 2082.42526 R-squared = 0.0039
Adj R-squared = -0.0051
Total 232046.988 112 2071.84811 Root MSE = 45.634
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>jtj [95% Conf. Interval]
expendedu .6823729 1.039251 0.66 0.513 -1.376973 2.741719
_cons 15.67314 18.48945 0.85 0.398 -20.96493 52.31121
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Result 17.
regress intensity PLbooksPC
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 113
F( 1, 111) = 0.41
Model 849.93362 1 849.93362 Prob > F = 0.5243
Residual 231197.054 111 2082.85634 R-squared = 0.0037
Adj R-squared = -0.0053
Total 232046.988 112 2071.84811 Root MSE = 45.638
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
PLbooksPC -2.587312 4.050289 -0.64 0.524 -10.61323 5.438606
_cons 29.49805 5.328887 5.54 0.000 18.9385 40.05759
Result 18.
regress intensity internetPC
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 113
F( 1, 111) = 0.93
Model 1918.34315 1 1918.34315 Prob > F = 0.3382
Residual 230128.645 111 2073.23103 R-squared = 0.0083
Adj R-squared = -0.0007
Total 232046.988 112 2071.84811 Root MSE = 45.533
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>It| [95% Conf. Interval]
internetPC -10.19049 10.5939 -0.96 0.338 -31.18302 10.80203
_cons 29.75189 4.890577 6.08 0.000 20.06089 39.4429
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Result 19.
. regress intensity waterusetot
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 113
F( 1, 111) = 2.87
Model 5857.9339 1 5857.9339 Prob > F = 0.0928
Residual 226189.054 111 2037.73922 R-squared = 0.0252
Adj R-squared = 0.0165
Total 232046.988 112 2071.84811 Root MSE = 45.141
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>|tj [95% Conf. Interval]
waterusetot -1.69e-08 9.96e-09 -1.70 0.093 -3.66e-08 2.85e-09
_cons 32.49802 5.17561 6.28 0.000 22.24221 42.75384
Result 20.
regress intensity sharewateruseres
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 113
F( 1, 111) = 0.25
Model 524.546268 1 524.546268 Prob > F = 0.6170
Residual 231522.442 111 2085.78776 R-squared = 0.0023
Adj R-squared = -0.0067
Total 232046.988 112 2071.84811 Root MSE = 45.67
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
sharewater-s -.1634107 .3258545 -0.50 0.617 -.8091131 .4822917
_cons 33.13575 12.06573 2.75 0.007 9.226694 57.0448
L
47
Result 21.
. regress intensity electricusetot
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 112
F( 1, 110) = 2.10
Model 2961.29481 1 2961.29481 Prob > F = 0.1498
Residual 154868.764 110 1407.89786 R-squared = 0.0188
Adj R-squared = 0.0098
Total 157830.059 111 1421.89242 Root MSE = 37.522
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>jt| [95% Conf. Interval]
electricus-t -2.81e-10 1.94e-10 -1.45 0.150 -6.65e-10 1.03e-10
_cons 29.27466 4.584316 6.39 0.000 20.18962 38.3597
Result 22.
regress intensity indelectricusetot
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 112
F( 1, 110) = 1.38
Model 1954.71901 1 1954.71901 Prob > F = 0.2427
Residual 155875.34 110 1417.04855 R-squared = 0.0124
Adj R-squared = 0.0034
Total 157830.059 111 1421.89242 Root MSE = 37.644
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
indelectri-t -3.54e-10 3.02e-10 -1.17 0.243 -9.52e-10 2.43e-10
_cons 28.68702 4.710541 6.09 0.000 19.35184 38.02221
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Result 23.
. regress intensity indelectricuseshare
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 112
F( 1, 110) = 3.45
Model 4806.32353 1 4806.32353 Prob > F = 0.0657
Residual 153023.736 110 1391.12487 R-squared = 0.0305
Adj R-squared = 0.0216
Total 157830.059 111 1421.89242 Root MSE = 37.298
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
indelectri-e .400775 .2156141 1.86 0.066 -.0265216 .8280715
_cons -2.499238 15.23976 -0.16 0.870 -32.70087 27.7024
Result 24.
regress intensity threewastesval
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 110
F( 1, 108) = 0.49
Model 1035.42311 1 1035.42311 Prob > F = 0.4873
Residual 230172.57 108 2131.2275 R-squared = 0.0045
Adj R-squared = -0.0047
Total 231207.993 109 2121.17425 Root MSE = 46.165
intensity Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
threewaste-l -1.59e-09 2.29e-09 -0.70 0.487 -6.13e-09 2.94e-09
_cons 29.46166 4.969079 5.93 0.000 19.61208 39.31124
49
